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And	 call	 the	 agents	 who	 are	 persistently	 subject	 to	 structural	 injustice:	 structurally	
oppressed	agents.	






intuition	 that	 the	 wrong	 of	 structural	 injustice	 consists	 in	 disempowering	 particular	
groups	 with	 reference	 to	 some	 baseline	 and	 turn	 to	 a	 different	 issue:	 that	 of	 the	
obligations	of	members	of	such	groups	to	remedy	structural	injustice.	We	suggest	that	
responsibilities	 to	 remedy	 structural	 injustice	 come	 in	 degrees	 and	 that	 they	 differ	
depending	on	agents’	degree	of	epistemic	awareness	concerning	structural	injustice.	





The	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 II	 we	 offer	 some	 definitions	 and	
preliminary	 clarifications.	 In	 section	 III,	 we	 introduce	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 injustice	
relevant	 to	 our	 paper:	 epistemic	 injustice	 and	we	 discuss	 its	 relation	 to	what	we	 call	
epistemic	opacity.	We	suggest	that	epistemic	opacity	shapes	agents'	awareness	of	their	
oppression	 within	 a	 structure	 and	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 ascribing	
responsibilities.	 This	 can	 be	 done,	 by	 distinguishing	 between	 different	 degrees	 of	
awareness	 concerning	 structural	 injustice	 and	 by	 distributing	 responsibilities	 that	
correspond	 to	 these	 different	 degrees	 of	 awareness.	 In	 section	 IV	we	 begin	with	 the	
simple	case	of	those	who	are	oppressed	by	a	structure	and	epistemically	aware	of	their	
oppression.	We	 continue	 in	 section	V	with	 the	more	 complex	 case	 of	 agents	who	 are	





we	 discuss	 a	 different	 case	 of	 epistemic	 opacity:	 agents	 who	 believe	 that	 although	










perpetuated	 through	 it	 persistently	 disadvantage	 some	 social	 groups	 vis-à-vis	 others.	
Whatever	baseline	is	chosen	to	help	identify	structural	injustice,	if	the	injustice	is	to	count	
as	structural	and	not	merely	a	result	of	unfair	or	unequal	distribution,	it	must	express	
some	 more	 persistent	 or	 deeper	 power-differential	 between	 social	 groups.	 One	




particularly	salient	 feature	of	structural	 injustice	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	systems	of	social	
rules	seem	to	be	self-perpetuating.	For	example,	social	rules	might	have	been	created	by	
agents	who	no	 longer	exist	or	 they	might	have	emerged	as	a	result	of	 the	unintended	
consequence	of	certain	patterned	social	interactions.	They	might	continue	to	be	endorsed	
either	 through	negligence	or	 failure	 to	 correct	 them.	Or	 they	might	persist	because	of	
powerful	 social	 narratives	 upholding	 them	 or	 because	 they	 benefit	 agents	 who	 have	
become	impervious	to	the	oppression	of	others	but	continue	to	occupy	the	key	offices	and	
positions	that	allow	such	rules	to	be	replicated.		




social	rules	 that	 the	 structure	 replicates.	Thus,	 even	 if	 the	way	 such	distributions	and	
social	rules	come	about	 is	 independent	of	 the	will	and/or	 intentions	of	any	particular	
agent,	 such	 agents	 can	 nevertheless	 be	 attributed	 political	 responsibilities	 for	 the	
structural	 upshots	 of	 their	 actions.	 The	 term	 ‘political’	 is	 important	 here.	 Indeed,	 the	
model	of	responsibility	at	work	in	this	paper	is	of	a	‘political’,	as	distinctive	from	a	merely	
moral	responsibility.	As	several	 authors	have	argued,	political	 responsibility	need	not	
rest	 on	 the	 usual	 criteria	 for	 the	 assignment	 of	 causal	moral	 responsibility,	 such	 as	
intentionality,	 foreseeability	and	 ability	 to	have	done	otherwise.3	Although	we	cannot	
argue	 the	 point	 further	 here,	 in	 the	 paper	 we	 start	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 those	
oppressed	 by	 structural	 injustice	 have	 political	 responsibilities	 with	 regard	 to	 its	
remedy.4 	
Notice	 that	 social	 rules	 need	 not	 be	 coercively	 enforced	 in	 order	 to	 reproduce	
structural	 injustice:	 the	endurance	of	certain	conventions	and	the	way	they	 frame	the	
                                                             
3
 One	 very	 forceful	 position	 arguing	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 victims’	 political	 responsibilities	 to	 remedy	
structural	 injustice	 is	presented	by	 Iris	Marion	Young,	see	her	Global	 Justice	and	Political	Responsibility	












constrain	 others.	 All	 this	 is	 important	 because,	 as	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 what	 follows,	 the	




way	 in	 which	 structures	 operate	 and	 those	 who	 are	 negatively	 affected	 by	 them,	
complicating	the	task	of	reflecting	on	the	complicity	and	responsibilities	of	each.	
	 While	the	problems	of	ideological	distortion	and	false	consciousness	are	not	new,	




the	discussion	has	mainly	 focused	on	 the	 reasons	 for	which	 such	 resistance	might	be	
justified. 6 	Following	 Iris	 Marion	 Young	 and	 the	 model	 of	 political	 responsibility	
mentioned	 above	 we	 will	 assume	 that	 the	 victims	 of	 structural	 injustice	 have	 some	
responsibilities	to	engage	in	activities	“directed	at	transforming	those	structures”.7	But	
as	 Young	 has	 emphasised8 	it	 is	 important	 to	 complement	 this	 discussion	 with	 more	
attention	to	the	content	of	victims’	responsibilities.		
There	are	of	course	many	considerations	to	take	into	account	when	establishing	





                                                             
5	Cf.	Thomas	Pogge,	World	Poverty	and	Human	Rights,	(Verso:	London,	2002);	Daniel	Butt,	“On	Benefitting	
from	 Injustice”,	Canadian	 Journal	of	Philosophy,	37,	1	 (2007):	129-152;	Robert	E.	Goodin	and	Christian	
Barry,	“On	Benefitting	from	the	Wrongdoing	of	Others”,	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy,	31,	4	(2014):	363-
376.	
6 	Cf.	 Ann	 E.	 Cudd,	 Analysing	 Oppression	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2006),	 Daniel	 Silvermint,	
“Resistance	 and	Well-Being”,	The	 Journal	 of	 Political	 Philosophy21,	 4	 (2013):405–425;	 Carol	Hay,	 “The	










those	 who	 are	 in	 a	 condition	 of	 epistemic	 opacity	 can	 contribute	 in	 some	 way	 to	
remedying	 structural	 injustice,	 and	 nuanced	 enough	 to	 explain	 what	 form	 their	




where	 beneficiaries	 or	 perpetrators	 should	 instead	 be	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 attention.	
Another	worry	might	be	that	 to	place	so	much	emphasis	on	the	responsibilities	of	 the	
oppressed	contributes	to	increase	feelings	of	shame	and	self-resentment	on	the	side	of	
already	vulnerable	agents	who	might	 lack	 the	will,	 resources	and	opportunities	 (both	
material	and	symbolic)	to	speak	up	for	themselves.9	Although	it	is	important	to	remain	
aware	of	these	problems	(and	we	will	return	to	them	later),	it	is	also	important	not	to	
victimize	 the	 oppressed	 even	 further	 by	 obscuring	 their	 (perhaps	 limited)	 forms	 of	
agency.	 The	 trade-off	 between	 taking	 seriously	 the	 agency	 of	 victims	 and	 showing	









groups	 and	 not	 individuals	 is	 widely	 accepted	 in	 the	 literature. 10 	However	 our	
understanding	of	what	counts	as	a	structurally	oppressed	group	is	not	an	ontological	one.	
A	social	group	cannot	be	defined	pre-politically	and	 it	 is	never	only	 constituted	by	the	
objective,	 intrinsic	or	essential	 traits	 it	possesses	 such	as	 the	 colour	of	 the	 skin	of	 its	





















them,	 their	 access	 to	 offices	 and	 social	 positions,	 their	 opportunities	 for	 further	
development	and	so	on.	This	in	turn	points	to	the	degree	of	power	controlled	by	members	




	 It	 has	 often	 been	 noticed	 that	 structurally	 unjust	 systems	 of	 rules	 distort	 the	
beliefs,	norms	and	conventions	that	help	shape	the	cognitive	systems	of	those	embedded	
in	such	structures.	This	connects	to	one	way	in	which	the	concept	of	epistemic	injustice	
                                                             
11	Cf.	Haslanger,	Resisting	Reality,	ch.	2.	
12	Ibid.	pp.	99-100.	Related	social	constructivist	notions	of	“social	group”	can	be	found	in	most	feminist	
works	 focusing	 on	 oppression.	 For	example,	Nancy	 Fraser	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 not	 an	essentialising	 group	
“identity”	which	requires	recognition	but	the	status	of	 individual	group	members	regarding	their	social	
standing	vis-à-vis	others	(Nancy	Fraser,	"Rethinking	Recognition",	New	Left	Review,	vol.	3	(2000),	pp.	107-
120	 on	 p.	 113).	 Miranda	 Fricker	 emphasises	 that	 systemic	 testimonial	 injustices	 often	 operate	 along	

















knowledge	 and	 with	 the	 shared	 practices	 of	 elaboration	 and	 contestation	 of	 social	
meanings.		
	 This	is	an	important	aspect	of	structural	injustice.	However,	there	is	also	another	
important	 epistemic	 dimension	 to	 structural	 injustice	 that	 has	 been	 noticed	 less.	 The	
danger	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 marginalisation	 of	 certain	 voices	 in	 their	 allegedly	 equal	
participation	 in	the	 formation	of	social	meanings.	 It	 is	also	that,	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	
views	of	the	oppressed	tend	to	take	shape	in	such	a	distorted	epistemic	environment,	the	
oppressed	 themselves	 might	 not	 be	 able	 to	 fully	 understand	 or	 acknowledge	 their	


























to	victims	of	 injustice	 to	ensure	 that	one	 can	bear	witness	 to	 their	pain	 in	a	way	 that	
respects	their	feelings.17	It	is	also	that	any	account	seeking	to	remedy	structural	injustice	
in	 ignorance	of	 the	standpoint	of	 the	oppressed	would	be	both	paternalistic	and	more	
likely	to	err	–	an	important	point	that	standpoint-theorists	have	persuasively	made.18		
Yet	all	this	might	seem	to	reveal	a	tension.	Either	the	oppressed	are	sufficiently	
aware	 of	 their	 oppression	 and	 able	 to	 take	 up	 political	 responsibilities	 to	 remedy	
structural	injustice,	in	which	case	the	argument	for	epistemic	injustice	runs	the	risk	of	
appearing	 overstated.	 Or	 epistemic	 injustice	 is	 present	 and	 pervasive	 but	 then	 it	
paralyses	the	agency	of	the	oppressed	leaving	us,	as	in	Brecht’s	famous	phrase,	with	"only	
injustice	 and	 no	 outrage".19 	Indeed,	 acknowledging	 responsibilities	 presupposes	 that	







rather	 than	 full	 endorsement	 or	 full	 denial	 of	 their	 responsibilities.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	




perhaps	 even	 mediate	 between	 the	 position	 of	 those	 who	 emphasize	 structural	




Thomas,	 "Moral	 deference"	 in:	 Theorizing	 Multiculturalism,	 ed.	 Cynthia	 Willet	 (Oxford:	 Blackwell	
Publishers,	1998),	pp.	359-381.	
18 	See	 for	 example	 Alison	Wylie’s	 claim	 that	 “those	 who	 are	 subject	 to	 structures	 of	 domination	 that	




















issues	 from	an	actual	case	of	oppression,	 in	 the	right	way".	This	in	 turn	means	that	 the	
agent	must	"intend"	to	"lessen	oppression"	and	"send	a	message	of	revolt"	through	her	
actions.20	Since	what	is	unjust	in	cases	of	structural	oppression	are	social	rules,	it	seems	
plausible	 to	 suggest	 that	 their	 disruption	 and	 reform	 requires	 some	 collective	 and	
political	 action.	 Hence	 it	 seems	 obvious	 that	 oppressed	 agents	who	 are	 epistemically	
aware	 have	 a	 responsibility	 to	 contribute	 to	 collective	 political	 action	 against	 their	
oppression.		
A	 paradigmatic	 illustration	of	how	 such	 responsibilities	 are	 usually	 discharged	
might	be	the	campaigns	of	resistance	to	exploitation	represented	by	workers’	strikes	for	
much	of	the	20th	century	history.	We	could	describe	such	protests	as	instances	in	which	
most	of	 the	oppressed	are	epistemically	aware	of	 their	condition	of	oppression	–	 they	
know	both	that	they	suffer	from	an	injustice	and	that	it	is	structural	in	nature.	Therefore,	
they	 make	 important	 sacrifices	 to	 take	 up	 a	 demanding	 responsibility	 to	 challenge	
structural	 injustice.	For	example,	epistemically	aware	activists	(e.g.	union	 leaders)	are	
able	 to	 successfully	 identify	 those	 complicit	 with	 the	 production	 or	 replication	 of	
structural	rules	and	to	organise	collective	action	(prior	to	unionisation	these	initiatives	
would	have	either	been	absent	for	fear	of	sanctions	or	taken	a	more	individual	or	more	
spontaneous	 form).	 The	 duty	 to	 create	 appropriate	 political	 structures	 enabling	








about	 discharging	 their	 political	 responsibilities,	 it	 might	 be	 worth	 distinguishing	
between	 different	 stages	 in	 the	 process	 (this	 will	 also	 help	 us	 reflect	 on	 the	
responsibilities	of	oppressed	agents	under	conditions	of	epistemic	opacity	later	on).	As	a	
first	 step,	 what	 might	 be	 required	 is	 mere	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 many	 scattered	 and	
apparently	unrelated	instances	of	wrongdoing	as	revealed	through	either	the	suffering	
and	actions	of	the	oppressed	themselves	or	through	a	counter-factual	comparison	with	







there	any	properties	 that	 they	 share	and	 that	 seem	 to	 link	all	 of	 these	 cases?	Can	we	
account	 for	 exceptions?	 This	 second	 stage	 would	 allow	 to	 uncover	 a	 pattern	 behind	
individual	 cases	 of	wronging	 and	 expose	 them	 as	 part	 of	 a	wider	 structure	 of	 power	
relations	which	conditions	the	resources,	positions	and	opportunities	of	those	subjected	
to	it	–	in	short	it	would	unveil	them	as	injustices	as	opposed	to	misfortunes.	At	this	stage,	






the	 pattern	 takes	 shape.	 This	 amounts	 to	 revealing	 the	 structural	 character	 of	 the	






to	 trigger	 an	 unequal	 allocation	 of	 roles	 and	 positions	 –	 for	 example	 by	 conferring	
advantages	to	members	of	some	groups	over	others	and	exacerbating	the	vulnerability	
of	 the	 latter	within	 a	 system.	What	makes	 such	 social	 rules	 structurally	 unjust	 is	 the	
stability	they	confer	on	such	patterns	by	themselves	expressing	and	perpetuating	deeper	
and	unjustifiable	power	differentials.	For	example,	at	this	stage	one	would	need	to	explain	
which	 underlying	 social	 rules	 and	 practices	 produce,	 stabilize	 and	 perpetuate	 the	
unequal	distribution	of	power	and	resources	between	workers	and	capitalists.	Therefore,	
particular	 attention	 must	 be	 drawn	 to	 those	 justification	 narratives	 stabilizing	 and	
legitimizing	such	norms,	social	rules	and	expectations.21	
The	responsibilities	to	unveil	and	explicate	unjust	structural	rules	seem	to	form	






	As	we	 have	 described	 it,	 the	 political	 responsibility	 to	 help	 remedy	 structural	
injustice	involves	a	responsibility	to	act	both	at	the	level	of	uncovering	unjust	structural	
rules	and	at	 the	 level	of	organisation	and	support	 for	 collective	activities	 that	 seek	 to	
disrupt	and	change	them.	Epistemic	awareness	is	clearly	crucial	to	both	stages,	where	the	
responsibility	to	fight	oppression	is	most	demanding	and	the	costs	of	mobilisation	can	be	
very	 high.	 Yet,	 those	 epistemically	 aware	 agents	 in	 a	 position	 to	 discharge	 such	
responsibilities	might	only	be	a	scattered	few.	
However,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 political	 responsibilities	 of	 those	 who	 are	 in	 a	




                                                             
21	See	for	a	discussion	of	this	problem	Rainer	Forst,	Normativität	und	Macht	(Frankfurt:	Suhrkamp,	2015),	
ch.	3.	


















result	 from	 a	 system	 of	 rules	 that	 is	 structurally	 unjust.	 In	 this	 case	 an	 agent	 might	
experience	various	 forms	of	disadvantage	but	she	will	perceive	these	as	 the	results	of	









who	 is	 paid	 very	 little,	 frequently	 required	 to	 perform	 out-of-hours	 jobs,	 or	 verbally	
abused	by	an	employer	who	ridicules	his	strange	cultural	habits.	Such	a	worker	might	
lack	the	epistemic	resources	needed	to	understand	his	predicament	as	one	that	stems	
                                                             
23	Some	of	these	issues	are	well-captured	in	the	vast	social	psychological	literature	on	correspondence	bias	





system	of	rules	 that	prohibits	 foreign	workers	 from	taking	advantage	of	 the	country’s	
labour	laws,	that	prevents	him	from	accessing	various	forms	of	union	protection	and	that	
would	guarantee	him	social	securities	and	render	him	less	vulnerable	to	exploitation	and	






moral	wrong.	This	makes	 it	very	difficult	 to	assign	him	responsibilities	 for	remedying	
structural	injustice.	
Secondly,	consider	a	slightly	different	case	of	epistemic	opacity:	what	we	might	call	




well	 point	 to	 the	 persistence	 of	 injustices,	 for	 example	 they	 might	 blame	 corrupt	
politicians,	the	fact	that	other	fellow-citizens	only	pursue	private	interests	or	the	fact	that	










more	 powerful	 states	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 weaker.	 In	 this	 case,	 epistemic	 opacity	
accounts	for	the	inability	to	link	one's	keenly	felt	sense	that	some	injustice	is	being	done	




look	as	 if	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	oppressed	people	 in	 conditions	of	 either	partial	or	 total	
epistemic	opacity	to	take	political	responsibility	for	structural	injustice.	Being	helpless	in	
detecting	the	structural	roots	of	their	grievances,	they	might	be	thought	unable	to	channel	
reactive	 feelings	of	 frustration,	 resentment	or	anger	 in	 the	 right	way.25	And	yet,	 if	we	
consider	political	responsibilities	among	the	oppressed	as	a	matter	of	degree,	it	is	still	






sources	of	 that	dissatisfaction	 in	 the	appropriate	 site.	 In	doing	 so	 they	will	be	able	 to	
participate	in	the	creation	of	a	community	of	epistemic	solidarity26	which	will	facilitate	
the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 process	 necessary	 to	 undermine	 structural	 injustice	 that	 we	
identified	 above:	 observing	 individual	 instances	 of	moral	wronging	 and	 reflecting	 on	
shared	 features	 of	 individual	 experiences	 of	 such	 wrongs	 so	 as	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
identification	of	a	potential	pattern	of	injustice.	Notice	that	this	does	not	require	agents	
in	 conditions	 of	 total	 epistemic	 opacity	 to	 establish	 the	 link	 between	 their	 individual	
experiences	and	structural	injustice	themselves.	All	it	requires	of	them	is	to	be	sensitive	
to	the	treatment	they	receive	from	others,	to	give	their	views	on	the	reasons	for	why	the	
hardship	 they	 face	 occurs	 and	 to	 share	 the	 cognitive	 experiences	 they	 accumulate,	


















potentially	 correcting	 each	 other's	 misperceptions,	 consolidating	 what	 seem	 like	
plausible	 views	 and	so	on.	 This	 can	 occur	 in	 the	 usual	 sites	of	 socialisation	 (be	 them	
workplaces,	social	networking	groups,	educational	institutions	or	even	simply	the	café	or	
the	 pub).	 Voicing	 dissatisfaction	with	 single	 episodes	 of	 abuse	 or	mistreatment	 helps	
provide	necessary	epistemic	material	for	the	wider	social	process	of	unveiling	structural	
injustice.	For	example,	individual	stories	about	problematic	episodes	can	help	increase	








such	 agents	might	 deplore	 the	 existence	 of	material	 inequality	 between	workers	 and	
capitalists,	 but	 fail	 to	 see	 the	 underlying	 structural	 reasons	 for	 this	 distribution.	 But	
notice	that	since	these	agents	acknowledge	the	presence	of	an	injustice,	they	still	have	
responsibilities	 for	 associating	 with	 others	 to	 remedy	 it.	 Through	 the	 process	 of	
associating	 with	 others	 for	 collective	 political	 action,	 such	 agents	might	 also	 acquire	
additional	 (epistemic)	 responsibilities	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 sources	of	 that	 injustice.	 Such	
epistemic	responsibilities	might	consist,	for	example,	in	comparing	different	instances	of	
injustice,	 seeking	 to	 cluster	 together	 potentially	 relevant	 phenomena,	 identifying	 a	
pattern	 behind	 individual	 cases	 and	 thus	 contributing	 to	 rendering	 explicit	 certain	







becoming	 more	 transparent	 still:	 such	 agents	 will	 realise	 for	 example	 that	 there	 are	
structural	obstacles	to	remedying	the	problems	at	the	level	in	which	they	initially	thought	
they	 needed	 to	 be	 remedied,	 and	 the	 process	 of	 acquisition	 of	 further	 epistemic	
 16 











override	 all	 other	 considerations.	 Obviously,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 responsibilities	of	 the	
oppressed	 needs	 to	 be	 determined	 also	 with	 a	 view	 to	 other	 considerations	 such	 as	
overall	costs,	other	constraints	on	agency,	and	also	such	considerations	of	second-order	
unfairness.	Here	we	 try	 to	 spell	out	 the	 content	of	 the	political	 responsibilities	of	 the	








                                                             
27 	Indeed,	 a	 similar	 process	 of	 acquisition	 of	 further	 epistemic	 awareness	 in	 the	 course	 of	 taking	







expected	 to	 educate	 the	 heterosexual	 world.	 The	 oppressors	 maintain	 their	 position	 and	 evade	 their	










nature	 of	 injustice	 we	 discussed	 above.	 We	 suggest	 to	 label	 this	 phenomenon	
“exceptionalism”.	Take	 the	example	of	women	 in	academia	who	agree	 that	 in	general	
their	social	group	(women	in	academia)	suffer	from	some	form	of	structural	injustice	but	
affirm	that	they	are	immune	from	it.	For	example,	they	might	think	that	they	are	exempt	




those	 because	 they	 are	 blessed	 with	 non-xenophobic	 neighbours,	 colleagues	 or	
employers.	
	 The	position	of	such	oppressed	agents	is	also	one	of	epistemic	opacity.	Precisely	
because	 of	 its	 structural	 character	with	 regard	 to	 various	 forms	 of	 disempowerment	
structural	oppression	must	affect	all	members	of	disadvantaged	groups.	While	agential	
oppression	(i.e.	oppression	that	is	directed	or	individualised)	might	indeed	be	absent	in	
such	cases,	 structural	oppression	 is	 still	present	and	as	 such	determines	not	only	 the	
pattern	of	distribution	of	freedoms,	options	or	life-chances,	but	also	the	underlying	social	
rules	 generating	 and	 perpetuating	 such	 distributions.	 Thus,	 a	 female	 member	 of	 an	
upper-class	group	might	encounter	more	deference	than	discrimination	in	her	everyday	
life	 but	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	qua	woman	 the	 rules	 structuring	 her	 ability	 to	make	
projects	are	not	constrained	 in	the	ways	we	discuss.	30	One	might	of	course	still	object	
that	 some	 intersectional	 identities	mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 oppression	 to	 the	 extent	 of	
making	it	impossible	for	victims	of	structural	injustice	to	voice	their	critique	in	the	ways	
we	have	described.31	But	 if	our	analysis	on	 the	ascription	of	political	 responsibility	 to	
everyone	 implicated	 in	 structural	 injustice	 is	 correct,	 how	 much	 of	 the	 injustice	 is	
















To	 determine	 what	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 oppressed	 are	 in	 cases	 of	
exceptionalism,	it	might	make	sense	to	take	a	closer	look	into	why	certain	agents	think	
they	are	exempt	 from	structural	oppression.	 In	what	 follows	we	want	 to	 suggest	 that	
individually	 rational	 reasons	 for	 exceptionalism	 all	 relate	 to	 the	 primary	 action-
environment	 of	 those	 affected,	 who	 fail	 to	 link	 their	 first-order	 experiences	 to	
disempowerment	occurring	at	the	level	of	higher-order	social	rules.	So	why	might	our	
female	 academic	 think	 that	 justice-related	 problems	 with	 regard	 to	 women	 in	 the	
academic	system	exist,	but	do	not	apply	to	her	personally?	One	first	reason	might	be	that	
she	acts	in	such	a	way	as	to	avoid	negative	constraints	or	punishments	on	the	level	of	her	
primary	 action-environment.	 If	 she	 avoids	 wearing	 particular	 clothes	 and	 eschews	
certain	 kinds	 of	 interaction	 with	 her	 male	 colleagues	 and	 superiors	 in	 order	 not	 to	
become	objectified	or	sexualised,	we	could	 say	 that	she	 responds	 to	oppressive	 social	
rules	 with	 anticipatory	 deference. 32 	This	 might	 amount	 to	 a	 variant	 of	 internalised	


























case	 when	 unmarried	 women	 take	 life	 and	 career	 decisions	 with	 a	 view	 to	 their	
anticipated	role	within	marriage	or	with	a	view	to	marriage	being	the	primary	societal	
goal	 ascribed	 to	 womanhood).35 	Similarly,	 social	 rules	 regulating	 the	 distribution	 of	




persistently	 disempowers	 them	 qua	member	 of	 a	 disadvantaged	 group.	 For	 example,	
even	if	the	range	of	options	to	choose	from	become	formally	equalised	between	man	and	
women,	 the	 formation	 of	 females’	 capacity	 for	 choice	 –	 their	 higher-order	 power	 to	





social	 rules	 significant	 to	 one’s	 own	 life.	 For	 this	 more	 demanding	 notion	 of	 non-
domination	to	be	in	place,	one	needs	to	be	able	to	consider	oneself	as	an	equal	participant	
to	the	interpretive	practices	on	which	the	generation	of	social	rules	and	meanings	rests.	
Importantly,	 oppressed	 agents	 who	 think	 they	 are	 exceptional,	 are	 not	 in	 an	 equal	
position	to	decide	about	the	social	meaning	of	the	norms	and	conventions	that	shape	and	
constraint	their	behaviour.	The	power	of	our	exceptional	female	academic	to	take	career-










social	 rules	 prevail	 in	 the	 society	 of	 our	 hard-working	 immigrant,	 her	 agency	will	 be	
constrained	from	these	even	if	she	claims	not	to	be	negatively	affected	by	them.	Examples	
of	 such	 structural	 effects	might	 include	 the	 lack	 of	 appropriate	 role-models	 from	her	
social	group,	facing	comparatively	more	difficulties	in	pursuing	career-paths	perceived	
as	atypical,	special	demands	of	justification	both	from	culturally	dominant	and	latently	
xenophobic	 background-assumptions	 (“are	 you	 really	 sure	 your	 kids	 should	 enrol	 in	
higher	education”),	and	so	forth.	
Note	 that	 it	might	 be	 fully	 rational	 for	 oppressed	 agents	 to	 avoid	 linking	 their	





imaginaries	 that	 conceptualise	 responsibility	 and	 agency	 on	 a	 purely	 individual	 level	
whilst	shielding	from	view	their	structural	and	social	preconditions.37		
Nevertheless,	the	danger	of	this	position	is	a	more	general	form	of	alienation	from	





                                                             
36	Indeed,	acknowledging	how	structural	oppression	also	applies	to	oneself	runs	the	risk	of	putting	one	
onto	 the	wrong	 side	 of	 the	 fence,	 turning	 one	 into	 an	 official	member	 of	 the	 group	 of	 the	 “weak”	 or	
“victimised”.	This	might	be	 linked	 to	a	general	 suspicion	 that	 structural	explanations	counter	personal	
achievements:	 if	our	female	academic	has	worked	long	and	hard	extra-hours	in	order	to	gain	the	same	
standing	as	her	male	colleagues,	it	might	be	a	general	reflex	to	deny	that	her	present	position	has	anything	
to	do	with	structural	 reasons.	Another	 important	 factor	here	might	be	 the	existence	of	powerful	 social	
narratives	of	blaming	the	victim	–	think	about	all	the	examples	of	everyday	discourse	which	blames	women	
for	behaving	in	a	 sexualised	way	and	 therefore	accuses	 them	of	bearing	some	responsibility	 for	 sexual	
assaults	on	them.	
37	This	has	been	an	important	criticism	of	Sandberg,	Sheryl,	Lean	In:	Women,	Work,	and	the	Will	to	Lead,	














exceptionalism	 is	 the	 missing	 link	 between	 individuals'	 adaptive	 strategies	 to	 a	









and	 more	 pervasive	 social	 rules	 to	 which	 both	 of	 their	 behavioural	 strategies	 react.	
Taking	up	the	responsibility	to	explain	and	express	just	why	one	thinks	one	is	exceptional	
and	 comparing	 one's	 experience	 with	 that	 of	 others	 might	 lead	 agents	 to	 discover	








On	 the	 other	 hand,	 agents	 who	 benefit	 from	 being	 successful	 in	 the	 system	 might	







that	 although	 they	 tend	 to	 ascribe	 their	 exceptional	 position	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	
identifying	margins	of	agency	while	playing	by	the	dominant	rules,	they	are	not	in	control	
of	the	rules	themselves	and	hence	lack	real	social	and	political	power.	Only	by	exchanging	
reasons	 and	 explanations	 for	 their	 exceptionalism,	 oppressed	 agents	 might	 come	 to	
observe	structural	reasons	for	their	position	and	hence	build	towards	a	more	open	public	










activism.	 In	 this	 sense,	 oppressed	 agents	who	 are	 in	 some	way	 exceptional	might	 be	
important	role	models	for	other	members	of	their	groups,	and	their	example	is	especially	
progressive	and	encouraging	when	they	have	obtained	some	degree	of	awareness	of	the	
different	 ways	 in	 which	 one	 can	 be	 implicated	 in	 structural	 injustice.	 For	 example,	
powerful	 female	 professors	 who	 “made	 it”	 are	 surely	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 raise	





they	 obtain	 access	 to	 positions	 of	 power,	 including	 political	 office.	 Here	 individual	
experiences	 far	 from	 serving	 as	 a	 counter-example	 to	 the	 pervasiveness	of	 structural	





injustice,	 can	 help	 to	make	 issues	 of	 structural	 injustice	more	 visible	 and	 to	mobilise	
collective	forms	of	fighting	against	them.	In	all	these	cases,	once	we	see	the	process	of	
acquiring	further	epistemic	awareness	for	one's	position	as	distributed	along	different	
















we	 understand	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 oppressed	 to	 be	 grounded	 on	 the	 special	
political	responsibility	that	everyone	implicated	in	the	reproduction	of	an	unjust	structure	
has	to	contribute	remedying	the	injustice	of	that	structure.	We	recognise	that	there	might	
be	 alternative	 ways	 to	 ground	 such	 responsibilities	 and	 that	 these	 alternatives	 are	
different	 from	 the	 political	 route	 which	 we	 have	 followed	 and	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	
structural	 and	 not	 necessarily	 intended	 or	 foreseeable	 upshots	 of	 one’s	 actions. 41	
However,	 once	 we	 assume	 the	 plausibility	 of	 the	 political	 route	 for	 grounding	
responsibilities,	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 reflect	on	 the	exact	degree	of	 epistemic	awareness	
relevant	to	specifying	the	content	of	those	responsibilities.		Thus,	even	if	the	ground	for	









structural	 injustice	 to	 do	 their	 part	 remedying	 it,	 the	 content	 of	 such	 responsibilities	
remains	 distinct	 from	 more	 general	 and	 forward-looking	 duties	 to	 abstain	 from	
contributing	 to	 structural	 injustice.	 It	 is	 also	 distinct	 from	 the	 special	 duties	 of	




“responsibilities”	 and	 not	 duties	precisely	 to	 avoid	 linking	 political	 responsibilities	 to	
very	 stringent	 demands	 that	 could	 be	 discharged	 at	 very	 high	 cost	 to	 the	 victims	 of	
structural	injustice.	While	duties	of	justice	are	often	taken	to	be	stringent,	enforceable	
and	determinate	duties,	it	is	clear	that	none	of	the	political	responsibilities	discussed	here	
are	 enforceable	 in	 a	 literal	 sense,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 their	 content	 is	 relatively	
indeterminate.42	Nevertheless	given	their	grounding	in	practices	of	structural	injustice,	it	




It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 epistemic	 opacity	 in	 the	
awareness	of	injustice	is	only	one	consideration	to	take	into	account	when	fully	specifying	
the	concrete	content	of	 the	responsibilities	of	 the	oppressed	with	regard	to	structural	
injustice.	 It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 this	 perspective	 must	 be	 complemented	 by	 other	








be	very	 costly	but	 to	a	 lesser	degree.	This	 clarification	might	help	deflect	 some	of	 the	









In	 this	 paper,	 we	 assumed	 that	 agents	 who	 are	 structurally	 oppressed	 have	
responsibilities	 to	 oppose	 their	 oppression,	 but	 we	 have	 argued	 that	 these	
responsibilities	need	to	be	differentiated	according	to	the	degrees	of	awareness	those	
agents	have	with	regard	to	structural	injustice.	We	suggested	to	distinguish	three	kinds	
of	 “epistemic	 opacity”:	 full	 epistemic	 opacity,	 partial	 epistemic	 opacity	 and	
exceptionalism.	In	the	case	of	full	epistemic	opacity,	it	seems	difficult	to	ascribe	political	
responsibilities	 above	 the	 responsibility	 to	 voice	 one’s	 dissatisfaction	 with	 single	
instances	of	apparent	injustices.	On	the	other	hand,	we	argued	that	agents	in	conditions	
of	 partial	 epistemic	 opacity	 and	 agents	who	 feel	 exceptional	 in	 not	 being	 affected	 by	
structural	 injustices	 may	 have	 stronger	 responsibilities.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 agents	 in	
conditions	of	partial	epistemic	opacity,	we	suggested	responsibilities	of	reflection	on	the	
sources	of	the	accepted	injustice,	aimed	at	helping	such	agents	identify	a	pattern	behind	
individual	 cases	 and	 contributing	 to	 rendering	 concealed	 rules	 explicit.	 In	 the	 case	of	
exceptionalism	we	suggested	responsibilities	that	encourage	agents	to	link	up	individual	
experiences	to	more	general	background	assumptions.	Particularly,	by	communicating	
and	 associating	 with	 others	 in	 a	 similar	 position	 but	 with	 different	 reasons	 for	
exceptionalism,	we	suggested	that	underlying	oppressive	rules	and	their	pervasiveness	
might	 become	 more	 visible.	 All	 this	 might	 further	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	
collective	strategies	of	empowerment	and	change,	leading	to	potentially	more	demanding	
political	responsibilities	to	transform	the	current	oppressive	system.		
	
	
	
